

SECRET

22

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO.

DATE

SR/PC/1

1/15/52

TO	ROOM NO	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
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Para 7 should be
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7 to 8: IF you have copy of
this, return Spear for
P+O files.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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SECURITY INFORMATION

14 January 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR: []

SUBJECT: BGFIEND Coup de Main Operations

1. While considering implementation of the 1952 BGFIEND harassment program, it is of the utmost importance to balance carefully the value of any such action against consequences which might prejudice accomplishment of the penetration and intelligence missions.

2. Although ^{BGFIEND} ~~we~~ possess ^{is} an immediate capability for launching coup de main actions, ~~we~~ believe it is advisable to subordinate such action at this time in favor of missions to secure operational intelligence, to develop a clandestine resistance organization and to harass the Communist Government of Albania by non-violent means.

3. This belief is conditioned by the basic antagonism, under cold war conditions, between penetration and coup de main operations. The accomplishment of the BGFIEND mission requires the successful establishment, this year, of clandestine high level agents and resistance groups. These fundamental operations require a receptive and cooperative popular attitude toward our agents and the efforts of the NCFA.

4. Acts of terror or violence, which would provoke retaliation against the population, should be avoided at this time. As terror invites reprisal, so would reprisal direct antagonism of the population against our agents and the NCFA. This would result because our action would offer no concurrent prospect of relief. Reprisal may be endured by a population in wartime when there is confidence that the resources of the United States are fully committed and the prospect of victory and relief is in view. Under cold war circumstances, however, it is likely that an active coup de main program would harvest resentment of the population, complicating accomplishment of the long range BGFIEND mission and stimulating Albanian security forces to greater efficiency without a compensatory benefit for our side.

5. In World War II experience, enemy troops and security forces exercised far less intensive internal control than is presently the case in Albania, where ^{the} ~~entire~~ resources of the state are directed toward that end.

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6. This basically different cold war problem in present day Albania presents the absolute necessity to coordinate the several phases of the BGFIEND program, so that immediate acts do not prejudice the achievement of the ultimate goal.

7. Essentially, the coup de main question is one of timing in relation to the overall BGFIEND mission. A program of coup de main acts against specific targets should be readied by the Field in order to have a standby plan for rapid activation when it is required. If a carefully planned test mission can be executed successfully, without reprisal, then consideration might be given to similar missions in the future.

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